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ENVIRONMENTAL  PERMITS:  PUBLIC  PROPERTY
RIGHTS  IN  PRIVATE  LANDS  AND  THE
EXTRACTION  AND  REDISTRIBUTION  OF
PRIVATE WEALTH
Jason Scott Johnston*
There are two ways of ensuring that one person’s use of his or her pri-
vate property does not infringe upon the rights of others.  On the approach
taken by the common law, there are few if any ex ante restrictions on prop-
erty use.  One may operate one’s factory, or develop one’s land, however one
wishes, subject to the constraint that if the property right holder’s operation
or development infringes upon the established rights of other people, then
the property right holder may be liable to pay damages for the harm that her
activity has caused to others.  And in cases where the activity has caused seri-
ous harm with little benefit, the right holder’s use may actually be enjoined
by the court.
In the modern regulatory state that has developed in the United States,
property right holders do not have such freedom.  Before a landowner can
develop her land or operate her factory, she must often obtain a permit or
license not just from state and local regulatory authorities but from federal
environmental regulators.  Such permit requirements are typically justified
on the ground that when activities risk irreversible or noncompensable harm,
the ex post common-law remedies of damages or an injunction are inade-
quate.  In the modern regulatory state, before a landowner can develop her
land or operate her factory, she must meet requirements that regulators have
imposed to ensure, they say, that such an activity does not cause such irrevers-
ible or noncompensable harm.1
© 2021 Jason Scott Johnston.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes,
so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Henry L. and Grace Doherty Charitable Foundation Professor of Law, University of
Virginia School of Law; Director, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics.  I am
grateful for helpful comments to participants in the NYU Classical Liberal Institute
Workshop on Public Valuation of Private Assets.  I am also grateful to the Editor-in-Chief of
the Notre Dame Law Review for outstanding editorial work.
1 See, e.g., Our Mission and What We Do, EPA (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/
aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do.
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Such permit requirements are a fundamental feature of contemporary
environmental regulation.  Indeed, as Richard Epstein argued in his path-
breaking work a quarter century ago, permit requirements are ubiquitous in
the modern American regulatory state.2  As Epstein argued, because permit
requirements give regulatory bureaucrats “absolute power to issue or deny
permits,” they have effectively “inverted” the distribution of power within the
legal system, giving interested regulators vastly more power than that con-
ferred upon neutral judges.3  Regulators have used this power to coerce pri-
vate businesses to pay a price for the privilege of doing business.  In this way,
the regulatory permit power has become an instrument by which regulators
take and redistribute private value.
Back in 1995, Professor Epstein famously termed such use of the permit
power a “racket,”4 and as observed very recently by Dave Owen,5 still today
many landowners and conservative critics would agree with the Supreme
Court’s description of the process (in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission)
as an “out-and-out plan of extortion.”6  However extortionate such deals may
be, regulators with permit power may require landowners to bargain with
them before developing their land or else face legal sanctions.  This Essay
explores in more detail how such bargaining has played out under two of the
most important permit regimes in federal environmental regulation: wet-
lands permits under section 404 of the Clean Water Act and incidental take
permits under Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act.
These permit regimes flip the common-law system on its head.  With
their existence (in the case of species) and scope and extent (in the case of
wetlands) the product largely of regulations issued by the agencies them-
selves rather than any direct statutory authority, the wetlands and habitat
modification permit regimes transfer a landowner’s common-law develop-
ment right to federal regulators, creating what are in effect public property
rights in private lands.  Unlike common-law property rights protection,
under which injunctive relief and potential criminal sanctions for violating
such an injunction are available only after a court balances the harm caused
by the potentially enjoined activity against the social value of that activity,
simply by denying a permit, federal regulatory agencies such as the Army
Corps of Engineers (for wetlands) and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Agency (for
species) can unilaterally trigger the accrual of fines and risk of imprison-
ment.  These agencies both hold the public property right and can trigger
sanctions for its violation.  Bargaining in the shadow of such sanctions, pri-
vate landowners trade away rights, diminishing the value of their lands, in
2 See Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 IOWA L. REV. 407,
407 (1995).
3 Id. at 413.
4 Id. at 416.
5 Dave Owen, Essay, The Conservative Turn Against Compensatory Mitigation, 48 ENV’T L.
265, 287–88 (2018).
6 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d
12, 14 (N.H. 1981)).
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exchange for permission that frees them from the risk of legal sanction.  As a
legal matter, regulators may value the harm to private land value caused by
their interpretation of what permit regimes require at any value they wish.
Regulators typically allow landowners some measure of development pro-
vided that the landowner pays a sum of money to a private firm that promises
to use the money to preserve undeveloped land elsewhere.  Thus, in the cen-
tral paradox of modern environmental permitting, in practice, the system of
ex ante permits—justified by the need to prevent irreversible and noncom-
pensable harm—has become one in which government allows private devel-
opment provided that some private landowners make a wealth transfer to
other private landowners.
I. PERMIT REQUIREMENTS
A. Wetlands and Endangered Species Permit Requirements and the Deals They
Induce
Many of the most important recent Supreme Court decisions involving
federal environmental regulation involve instances where regulators have
pushed to extend the scope of private activities that must get a federal permit
in order to be undertaken without risk of sanction.  The two most economi-
cally significant such permit programs are those involving wetlands and
endangered species.
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act prohibits the unpermitted discharge
of dredge or fill material into “navigable waters,”7 which in turn is defined by
that statute as “the waters of the United States.”8  Since 1977, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (“USACE”), the agency with statutory authority to grant
dredge and fill permits, has by regulation defined “the waters of the United
States” as including some wetlands.9  The Corps defines wetlands as areas
that are saturated with sufficient frequency and duration so as to support
vegetation that either prefers or requires such soil conditions.10
Over the decades, the USACE has extended the Clean Water Act’s per-
mit requirement to wetlands that are located farther and farther away from
any body of water that is navigable in any sense.  In 1985, in United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the Court upheld the USACE in requiring a
private landowner to obtain a permit before filling and developing eighty
acres of marshland near the shore of Lake St. Clair.11  During the 1980s and
1990s, the USACE extended its wetlands permit requirement far beyond wet-
lands that were adjacent to navigable water.  In Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, the Court decided whether the USACE could require a
wetland fill permit from a consortium of northern Illinois towns that were
seeking to convert into a solid waste landfill a sand and gravel pit mining
7 Clean Water Act of 1977 § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2018).
8 Id. § 1362(7).
9 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(2) (2019).
10 Id. § 328.3(c)(4).
11 474 U.S. 121, 124, 139 (1985).
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operation that had been abandoned decades before.12  The location was
nowhere near a navigable waterway, but the pits and depressions left over
from the mining operations filled with water, providing habitat for migratory
waterfowl.13  The Court struck down this attempted extension of the federal
wetlands permit requirement as likely intruding too far into traditional state
and local regulatory authority over land use.14  Just five years later, in Rapa-
nos v. United States, the Court said that the USACE could not require wetlands
permits from Michigan landowners who backfilled sometimes swampy lands
connected to navigable waters only through various drains and ditches.15
Again concerned that extension of the USACE’s permitting requirement to
such land development activities would intrude into a core area of state and
local regulatory authority, thus pushing “the envelope of constitutional valid-
ity,” Justice Scalia’s opinion for the plurality held that the USACE could
require permits only for the development of “those wetlands with a continu-
ous surface connection to bodies [of water] that are ‘waters of the United
States’ in their own right,” such as rivers and lakes.16
In a concurring opinion in Rapanos, Justice Kennedy set out an alterna-
tive definition of a wetland subject to the federal permitting requirement.17
Under Justice Kennedy’s definition, the USACE may require a permit from
any landowner whose lands contain wetlands that “either alone or in combi-
nation with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more
readily understood as ‘navigable.’”18  Justice Kennedy’s definition of statu-
tory wetlands tracks very closely the USACE’s own preferred definition.  As
there was no majority opinion in Rapanos, the USACE took Justice Kennedy’s
definition as the controlling law.
Since that time, individual USACE district engineers have made case-by-
case determinations of not only what constitutes a wetland, but when the
filling of such wetland, when combined with other “similarly situated lands in
the region,” would “significantly” impact the chemical and biological integ-
rity of waters that are actually navigable in some sense (or, as Justice Kennedy
put it, that are “more readily understood” as navigable).19  To say that such
determinations are unpredictable and uncertain would be a vast understate-
ment.  Landowners who have paid consultants to determine that their lands
do not contain federally regulated wetlands have often been shocked to dis-
cover that the USACE disagrees and that they cannot realize the full value of
their lands that they anticipated and must instead turn over a substantial frac-
tion of that value to the public.
12 531 U.S. 159, 163 (2001).
13 Id. at 164.
14 Id. at 163.
15 547 U.S. 715, 757 (2006) (plurality opinion).
16 Id. at 738, 742.
17 Id. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
18 Id.
19 Id.
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This is vividly, and tragically, displayed by the story of John Duarte and
Duarte Nurseries.20  In 2012, Duarte acquired 445 acres of land located in
rural Tehama County in north central California.21  Since the arrival of the
Spanish in California, the land had mostly been used for grazing, but in the
latter part of the twentieth century, the property had been used for wheat
farming; indeed, the U.S. Department of Agriculture classified it as contain-
ing (for purposes of federal agricultural programs) 430.7 acres of “wheat
base.”22  Like many farms in that part of California, Duarte’s land consisted
of gravelly clay soil, and after wheat farming ended, the land reverted to roll-
ing grassland.23  When California experiences a wet winter, rain collects in
the swales of such grassland, forming small ponds called vernal pools.24
These pools typically evaporate over the course of the dry California summer
and fall, but while they exist they provide a habitat for fairy shrimp.25  Duarte
knew about these pools and hired an environmental consultant to determine
their location and extent.26  In November 2012, Duarte then spent $50,000
in hiring a contractor to plow four-to-seven inches deep to ready his fields for
winter wheat planting.27  He told the contractor to avoid the vernal pools
that the consultant had identified.
When Duarte spoke with the USACE at that time and told them he was
going to farm his land, nothing was said to indicate he would need a wetlands
fill permit.28  However, sometime later in 2012, a USACE project manager
drove past Duarte’s field as it was being plowed and decided during this drive
that Duarte’s field was being tilled too deeply, so deeply that it went beyond
normal farming and instead constituted “deep ripping,” a practice that the
USACE views as a form of wetlands fill.29
Three months later, the USACE issued a cease and desist order, notify-
ing Duarte that, by plowing his fields, he had filled wetlands without a per-
mit.30  According to the USACE, under its 1994 definition of a wetland, there
were wetlands “scattered throughout”31 Duarte’s property, and, as demon-
20 These facts are taken from Complaint, Duarte Nursery, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 17 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (No. CIV. S.–13–2095), and also from Robin
Abcarian, A Land-Use Case That’s Enough to Furrow a Farmer’s Brow, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 15,
2016), https://www.latimes.com/local/abcarian/la-me-0115-abcarian-farmer-wetlands-
20160115-column.html.
21 Complaint, supra note 20, at 8; Abcarian, supra note 20; U.S. Department of Justice
Expert Team Report at 82, Duarte Nursery, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (No. CIV. S.–13–2095)
[hereinafter Document 129-2].
22 Complaint, supra note 20, at 8.
23 Abcarian, supra note 20.
24 Id.
25 See id.
26 Complaint, supra note 20 at 8–9; Abcarian, supra note 20.
27 Complaint, supra note 20, at 9; Abcarian, supra note 20.
28 Complaint, supra note 20, at 9.
29 Abcarian, supra note 20.
30 Complaint, supra note 20, at 9.
31 Id. at 10.
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strated by dozens and dozens of photos that USACE employees took on the
Duarte property, the three-to-four inch high furrows that Duarte’s contractor
had created when he plowed the property were actually “small mountain
ranges” that discharged fill (i.e., plowed dirt) into the wetlands.32
Duarte sued the USACE in federal court, contesting both the factual and
legal bases for the USACE’s cease and desist order.  Duarte argued, among
other things, that the 1994 wetlands delineation manual used by the USACE
had been superseded by a 2012 delineation manual that incorporated the
correct legal standard and that he had avoided all wetlands so classified
under the more recent manual.33  He also argued that all of his actions in
planting a wheat crop were normal farming practices that were exempt from
Clean Water Act wetlands permitting requirements.34
One portion of Duarte’s property as it looked after being plowed is
depicted in Figure 1 below.35  In the figure, one sees the field and a small
springtime flow of the type that the USACE deemed to be a regulated wet-
land.  Both such flows and the vernal pools on Duarte’s property are at most
seasonal.  They are not adjacent to any navigable waterway.  Some of the
flows and pools are near a small, equally variable stream called Coyote Creek.
About twelve miles from Duarte’s property, Coyote Creek flows into the Sac-
ramento River.  But the USACE did not justify its jurisdiction on the grounds
that Duarte’s property met the Rapanos plurality’s definition of a wetland as a
“continuous surface connection to bodies [of water] that are ‘waters of the
United States’ in their own right,” such as rivers.36  Instead, the USACE said
the “wetland depressions and swales on the Duarte Site” were wetlands sub-
ject to a permit requirement because “together with those similarly situated
streams and wetlands within the Coyote Creek watershed [they] are an inte-
gral part of and have a significant nexus with the Sacramento River given
their ecological and functional relationships.”37  Thus, the USACE asserted
jurisdiction under Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion definition.38
32 Abcarian, supra note 20.
33 Complaint, supra note 20, at 8–10.
34 Id. at 10 (invoking section 404(f)(1)(A) of the Clean Water Act).
35 Document 125-5, Duarte Nursery, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 17 F. Supp. 3d
1013 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (No. CIV. S.–13–2095).
36 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006) (plurality opinion); see Docu-
ment 129-2, supra note 21, at 151.
37 Document 129-2, supra note 21, at 151.
38 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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FIGURE 1: INTERMITTENT FLOW ON THE DUARTE PROPERTY
Duarte’s suit raised a number of serious legal and factual issues, and
although failing at the trial court level,39 it might well have eventually suc-
ceeded.  However, under the Clean Water Act (CWA), even negligently dis-
charging a pollutant into the “waters of the United States” without a USACE
permit can subject the landowner to criminal penalties of up to $25,000 per
day, while “knowing” discharges can mean criminal penalties of up to
$50,000 per day.40  As Duarte’s “discharge” occurred when he plowed his
fields in November 2012,41 while pursuing a lawsuit to establish that he was
not legally obligated to even get a permit, by 2017, the USACE said that he
owed over $40,000,000 in fines.42  Rather than risk an even higher penalty by
continuing to pursue his litigation, Duarte settled his case in August 2017 by
agreeing to pay a civil penalty of $330,000 to purchase $770,000 worth of
vernal-pool mitigation credits, and to perform remediation work in areas
where he had plowed.43  As Duarte explained:
39 Duarte Nursery, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d at 1026.
40 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)–(2) (2018).
41 See Complaint, supra note 20, at 9.
42 See John Herath, Duarte Nursery Settles with Corps of Engineers for $1.1 Million, AGWEB
(Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.agweb.com/news/crops/wheat/duarte-nursery-settles-corps-
engineers-11-million.
43 Consent Decree at 6, 8, Duarte Nursery, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (No. 2:13-CV-
02095).
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[G]iven the risks posed by further trial on the government’s request for up
to $45 million in penalties, and the catastrophic impact that any significant
fraction of that would have on our business, our hundreds of employees, our
customers and suppliers, and all the members of my family, this was the best
action I could take to protect those for whom I am responsible.44
B. The Market for Site-Specific Permits and the Environmental Impact Mitigation
Business That It Has Created
Duarte’s decision to comply with the USACE’s demands is one that has
been replicated by thousands of landowners across the country.  Just over the
period 2010–2014, the USACE issued 56,400 written authorizations under
various statutory permitting requirements (not just the section 404 wetlands
permit requirement).45  Section 404 wetlands fill permits are costly to obtain.
The cheapest section 404 permits are nationwide permits, general permits
for activities that have minimal impacts (generally less than 0.5 acres of fill).
Among the most common activities for which the USACE grants nationwide
permits are linear transportation projects, river bank stabilization, and
aquatic habitat restoration.46  Individual permits are granted for site-specific
fill activities with bigger impacts.  Even a standardized nationwide section 404
permit is not cheap, with the average applicant (as of the early 2000s) spend-
ing 313 days and $28,915.47  Individual permits, such as the one eventually
granted to Duarte as part of his settlement, are much more expensive, cost-
ing the applicant an average of 788 days and $271,596.48
The 313 days required on average for a landowner to get even a rela-
tively inexpensive nationwide permit is highly significant.  Most USACE per-
mits issued under section 404 are not individual permits, such as that
obtained at a cost of over $1 million by Duarte.  The vast majority are general
permits—either nationwide or regional—for “small or routine actions that
are similar in nature and typically have only minor environmental impacts.”49
For example, of the 285 permits issued by the Norfolk, Virginia, USACE
region over the period April–May 2017, only seven were standard, individual
44 Herath, supra note 42.
45 FORREST VANDERBILT, STEVEN MARTIN & DAVID OLSON, INST. FOR WATER RES., 2015-R-
03, THE MITIGATION RULE RESTROSPECTIVE: A REVIEW OF THE 2008 REGULATIONS GOVERNING
COMPENSATORY MITIGATION FOR LOSSES OF AQUATIC RESOURCES 11 (2015), https://www.
iwr.usace.army.mil/Portals/70/docs/iwrreports/2015-R-03.pdf.
46 See WSDOT LIAISON PROGRAM, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS SEATTLE DIST., WASH.
STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 404 AND 401 (& SECTION 10 OF THE
RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT): PERMITTING WORKSHOP 11 (2018), https://wsdot.wa.gov/sites/
default/files/2018/05/22/environmental-permitting-workshop-404-and-401.pdf.
47 David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of Environmental Regulation by
Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process, 42 NAT. RES. J. 59,
74–76 (2002).
48 Id.
49 Regulatory Permitting Program Pamphlet, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs Norfolk Dist.,
https://www.nao.usace.army.mil/Missions/Regulatory.aspx (select “Regulatory Info
Pamphlet”).
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permits.50  But this means that for about 200 projects over just a two-month
period in a single USACE region, landowners had to wait almost a full year
for a permit.  There is no exemption from potential CWA criminal liability
even for landowners whose activities have only “minor” environmental
impacts, entitling them to a general permit.  Hence, even for projects with
hardly any environmental impact, the landowner must wait a full year for a
permit or else risk criminal sanctions for developing her land.
The vast number of general permits routinely required by the USACE
belies the argument of Eric Biber and J.B. Ruhl—made in their critique of
Epstein’s concerns about permits as a “racket”—that because of the availabil-
ity of general permits, wetlands permitting actually is a system of entitlements
in which the “default rule” is that the landowner has permission to develop,
with “some action” by the USACE necessary to “shift to a prohibition in par-
ticular cases.”51  It is hard to see how a legal regime in which landowners on
average have to wait a year and spend about $29,000 to get a regulatory per-
mit for land development with only a “minor” environmental impact or else
face potential criminal sanctions constitutes one in which landowners have
permission to develop.
C. Wetlands Permits and the Mitigation Business They Have Created
As is to be expected given the frequency with which general versus indi-
vidual permits are granted, the vast majority of the time, the USACE has
deemed the impact of a permitted activity to be de minimis, requiring no
mitigation.  But for 10% of the authorizations granted over the period
2003–2008, or about 5600, it required compensatory mitigation.52  Some-
times such mitigation consists of steps taken by the landowner to minimize
the loss of wetlands on her property, but about half the time, the landowner
can meet her mitigation requirement either simply by paying a fee (11% of
the time over the 2010–2014 period) or by buying mitigation credits from a
wetlands mitigation bank (41% of the mitigation over the 2010–2014
period).53
Such a mitigation credit purchase, to the tune of $770,000, was the cost-
liest component of the settlement in the Duarte case.  Credits are offered for
sale by private wetlands mitigation banks that purchase lands with wetlands
and then commit to preserve such wetlands through devices such as conser-
vation easements.  Landowners who have agreed with USACE to mitigate the
loss of wetlands caused by their own land development can then buy pre-
served wetlands credits from mitigation banks that have been approved by
USACE.  Wetlands credits represent wetlands located elsewhere that typically
50 See Issued Permits, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, NORFOLK DIST. https://
www.nao.usace.army.mil/Missions/Regulatory/Issued-Permits/ (select April and May 2017
to download spreadsheets).
51 Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of Regulatory
Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 159 (2014).
52 VANDERBILT ET AL., supra note 45, at 11.
53 Id.
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have been preserved by being included in conservation easements on private
land.  By their express language, such easements permanently preclude
development of lands subject to the easement.
Wetlands mitigation banking was a regulatory agency creation.  It took
off after the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the USACE, and the
Agriculture Department’s Soil Conservation Service issued guidance in 1995
clarifying the requirements that wetlands banks had to meet in order to be
eligible to sell mitigation credits to landowners.54  According to the EPA, in
1992, there were only 46 permitted wetland mitigation banks, and most of
these were wetlands that had been acquired and preserved by state agencies
or large corporations so as to generate credits they could use to cover wet-
lands lost by their own land development.55  By the end of 2001, there were
219 approved wetland mitigation banks with 139,000 acres of wetlands
nationwide.56  Most of these were started by entrepreneurs who sold wetland
mitigation credits on regional markets.
Over the years, the wetlands mitigation credit market has grown steadily.
By the end of 2014, the USACE had approved 1428 mitigation bank sites.57
As of January 2021, just for the Jacksonville, Florida, USACE region, there
were 182 mitigation banks loaded into the Regulatory In-lieu Fee and Bank
Information Tracking System (“RIBITS”) database.58  Some of these are inac-
tive, and so the number is an overestimate.  However, hundreds of thousands
of acres are now included in wetlands mitigation banks.  The total amount of
wetland acres being mitigated varies directly with the level of land develop-
ment activity.  During the housing boom years of 2002 to 2006, the USACE
required about 49,000 acres of wetland mitigation per year.  Over the reces-
sionary period of 2007 to 2014, a little less than 30,000 acres per year were
mitigated.  Still, over the period of 2006 to 2014, the USACE required over
400,000 acres of wetland mitigation.59
D. Species Preservation and the Rise of Habitat Conservation Banks
The amount of wetlands that the USACE has required private landown-
ers to preserve in order to get a section 404 permit is not insignificant, but it
is far smaller than the amount of land preserved under a similar permitting
program under section 10 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973.60  Section
9 of the Endangered Species Act makes it unlawful to “take” any endangered
species, and that same statute defines “take” as “to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in




57 VANDERBILT ET AL., supra note 45, at 11.
58 See Banks & Sites, RIBITS, https://ribits.ops.usace.army.mil/ords/f?p=107:158:::
NO::P0_FFF_ID:29 (last visited Feb. 24, 2021) (filtering results for Jacksonville, Florida).
59 VANDERBILT ET AL., supra note 45, at 27.
60 See Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2018).
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any such conduct.”61  Under regulations promulgated in 1981, the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (“USFWS”) defines “harm” and “take” to include “signifi-
cant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding, feeding or sheltering.”62  Under this regulatory definition, if pri-
vately owned land happens to provide habitat for an endangered species, the
landowner’s development of her land may constitute a “taking” of an endan-
gered species.  Under section 11 of the Endangered Species Act, businesses
that violate the law by “taking” a protected species through land development
are not only liable for up to $25,000 in fines per violation.63  In addition, any
person who “knowingly” violates section 9 is subject to criminal penalties,
including potential imprisonment.64
Just as the Clean Water Act gives the USACE the authority to grant per-
mits allowing private land development that “discharges” a pollutant into a
wetland, so too does the Endangered Species Act (ESA) give the USFWS the
authority to grant permits for land development that significantly modifies
the habitat of an endangered species.  Under section 10 of the ESA, the
USFWS may grant a permit for “any taking otherwise prohibited” under sec-
tion 9 if it finds that “such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the
carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”65
In several high-profile cases, private landowners challenged the USFWS’s
interpretation that taking a species could be accomplished quite unintention-
ally, through private land development.  They generally lost, and then the
matter was settled for good when the Supreme Court upheld the regulation
in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon.66  Once sig-
nificant habitat modification was established as something that could trigger
potential criminal liability unless the landowner first obtained a permit, sec-
tion 10 became the basis for negotiations in which landowners promised to
preserve (or acquire) species habitat in exchange for a section 10 incidental
take permit granted by the USFWS.67  The negotiated deals, called Habitat
Conservation Plans, are often more complicated than wetland mitigation
agreements, in that they involve participation not just by the landowner, the
USACE, and wetland mitigation providers, but also various state and local
government entities.68  But like section 404 wetlands permit authorizations,
they occur because without an incidental take permit, a private landowner
61 Id. § 1532(19) (emphasis added).
62 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2019).
63 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1).
64 Id.
65 Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
66 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995).
67 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
68 See Endangered Species Permits Fact Sheet, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://
www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/permits/hcp/hcp_wofactsheet.html (last visited Feb.
24, 2021).
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whose development is deemed to constitute significant habitat modification
risks potentially large fines and criminal liability.69
With regulatory assurances that an incidental take permit would insulate
them from any potential liability, landowners have set aside vast amounts of
private land as preserves for endangered species.  For example, by the early
2000s, landowners large and small across the southern United States had pro-
tected hundreds of thousands of acres of privately owned pine forests as pro-
tected habitat for the red-cockaded woodpecker.70  Overall, between 1993
and 2008, USFWS granted 601 incidental take permits, under which about 48
million acres of private, state, and local lands—over 2% of total U.S. land
area and 3% of nonfederal land—were devoted to species protection.71
As is true with wetlands mitigation required by the USACE, very often
the USFWS allows landowners to obtain a required incidental take permit by
buying credits from a habitat conservation bank.  With wetlands mitigation
banking as a model, habitat conservation banking began in the mid-1990s in
California.72  As it is home to a relatively large number of endemic, protected
species, by 2002, there were 30 conservation banks in California.73  After the
USFWS released federal guidelines in 2003 setting forth the requirements
that a conservation bank had to meet to be able to sell credits, such banking
expanded into more states.  And as of August 2019, there were 158 approved
conservation banks protecting the habitats of 71 species loaded on the RIB-
ITS national database.74  Habitat conservation banks are species specific.  For
example, as of 2013, there were 18 banks conserving habitat for the Califor-
nia tiger salamander.  Prices vary tremendously across habitat types.  As of
2010, for example, the price of a vernal-pool preservation credit—the type of
habitat found on Durate’s land—was as high as $325,000 per credit, while in
the same year, the price of a credit for Utah prairie dog habitat was only
$1836.75  As on any market, prices reflect demand and supply.  Rapid devel-
opment and expansion of the Salt Lake City metro area has increased
demand for Utah prairie dog habitat credits, but such habitat is also in rela-
tively abundant supply outside the Salt Lake metro area.
69 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS UNDER THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT 1 (2011), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/hcp.pdf.
70 See Jim Carlton, Businesses, Greens Seek to Compromise on Issues, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23,
2003), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB105113076786383300.
71 William S. Eubanks II, Subverting Congress’ Intent: The Recent Misapplication of Section
10 of the Endangered Species Act and Its Consequent Impacts on Sensitive Wildlife and Habitat, 42
B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 259, 283 (2015).
72 Jessica Fox & Anamaria Nino-Murcia, Status of Species Conservation Banking in the
United States, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 996, 997 (2005).
73 Id. at 998.
74 Amanda Zhang & Katie Allen, Species and Habitat Conservation Banking, CONSERVA-
TION FINANCE NETWORK (Sept. 30, 2020), https://conservationfinancenetwork.org/2020/
09/30/species-and-habitat-conservation-banking.
75 Id.
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E. Winners and Losers from Wetlands and Habitat Mitigation Markets
Relative to a world in which wetlands and species permit requirements
directly restricted land development at particular sites, mitigation markets
alter the distribution of the benefits and costs of wetlands and species habitat
preservation.  Other things equal, the market incentive to find, preserve, and
then sell credits for wetlands and species habitat increases the supply of such
lands.  This lessens both the private and social cost of preserving such lands.
On the other hand, by using the criminal sanctions backing the permit
power to force some landowners to buy wetlands and species habitats that are
preserved offsite, federal environmental regulators effect a transfer of wealth
from private land developers to private land preservers.  Not only do regula-
tors use the permit power to coerce landowners who wish to develop their
land to incur the cost of providing the public goods inherent in wetlands and
species preservation, but they also enable other private landowners to profit
from such coercion.  Wetlands and species habitat banks often are created
when private landowners impose conservation easements on some portion of
their lands.  As is well known, the tax benefits from imposing such easements
accrue primarily to wealthier individuals.  To the extent that wealthy individ-
uals are the providers of wetlands and species habitat mitigation credits, the
existence of mitigation markets raises the specter of forcing landowners who
are developing their lands to conduct a business, such as Duarte, to pay
wealthier landowners—who might well have no interest in developing their
lands in any case—merely for the privilege of doing business.  Such a pros-
pect brings chilling echoes of earlier eras in both France and England, when
the rentier class demanded tribute from rising bourgeoisie with the temerity
to use their lands for industrial development.
F. The Economics of Private Value Extraction Through Permit Requirements
First set out half a century ago, the distinction between property rights
and liability rules has proven to be one of enduring insights of law and eco-
nomics.76  Under a liability rule, a landowner may use her land as she sees fit,
subject to potential damage liability if she is found to have caused harm to
other landowners or other people.  Under a property right, each landowner
has a right to enjoin adjacent landowner activities that cause such harm to
her.  Under the liability rule, a court determines the magnitude of harm
caused by a landowner’s activities.  The liability rule says that landowners may
use their land as they wish, but that they must pay for the harm they cause.
Under the property right, the landowner does not have such a right.  If her
use causes harm to neighbors, then that use may be enjoined.  Under the
supposition that such an injunction is backed up with sufficiently tough sanc-
tions—fines and imprisonment—the injunction halts the use, and it may be
resumed only if the enjoined landowner is able to offer some sort of deal—
76 See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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perhaps involving a payment plus changes in the way she is using her land—
that the complaining adjacent landowner is willing to accept.
Viewed in light of this distinction between property rights and liability
rules, one can conceptualize the federal wetlands and species protection reg-
ulatory systems as giving federal agencies a property right in wetlands and
species.  For understanding the economic consequences of the wetlands and
species permitting regimes, however, it is more useful to think of these
regimes not as giving government agencies a property right in wetlands and
species, but as changing the status quo allocation of property rights by taking
private landowners’ common-law right to land development and transferring
it to federal environmental agency bureaucrats.  Thus, environmental permit-
ting regimes award an entitlement to the inverse of land development, land
preservation, to federal agencies.
These permitting regimes are thus similar to but go beyond a system of
reverse eminent domain.  Under eminent domain, the government can take
private property rights but must, under the Fifth Amendment, pay just com-
pensation for the rights taken.77  Eminent domain is a liability rule approach
to forced land transfers to the government.  Under the reverse eminent
domain environmental permits regime, a government agency may declare
itself the holder of a right to preserve private land in an undeveloped state,
with the private landowner then subject to a regulatory cease and desist order
should she try to exercise a development right that she no longer owns.  A
landowner can bargain around the cease and desist order, buying back the
right to develop, but otherwise has no right to develop and can be criminally
prosecuted for violating the cease and desist order.  Whereas under eminent
domain, the government can take private property for a public use provided
that it pays.  Under the reverse eminent domain environmental permitting
system, the government holds a right to prohibit land development plus the
power to issue cease and desist orders, which automatically trigger potential
criminal liability.  In this way, the permitting power is like a super property
rights regime, where the sanction for violating the right begins to accrue
even before a court has determined that the right actually exists.
The reverse eminent domain regime created by the wetlands and endan-
gered species permit requirements generates incentives that are almost cer-
tain to prevent socially desirable private land development.  Why this is so
can be understood by comparing bargaining between a landowner and a reg-
ulatory agency asserting a public property right created by an environmental
permitting regime with bargaining between a landowner holding a private
property right and an adjacent landowner.  With private property rights, a
new owner may show up next door and demand that the landowner cease
her operations on the grounds that those operations constitute a nuisance.
Such operations might consist, for example, of a factory poultry farm that
generates both noxious fumes and large amounts of polluted wastewater.
But in most U.S. states, a court will find a legally actionable nuisance only if it
77 U.S. CONST. amend V.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-4\NDL410.txt unknown Seq: 15  5-APR-21 14:58
2021] environmental  permits 1573
deems the harm caused to the adjacent landowner to be both substantial and
unreasonable, where the harm is “unreasonable” only if the court finds that
the “gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor’s conduct.”78  It is
true that in some states, a nuisance finding follows for any “substantial” harm.
But in those states, as well as those that require a finding of “unreasonable”
harm, a court will not issue an order enjoining the nuisance unless it finds
that the harm from the legal nuisance greatly outweighs the social benefit of
that activity.79  Crucially, a landowner faces no threat of fines or imprison-
ment unless and until a court has decided that an injunction is required.
Until such an order issues, our poultry farm owner-operator incurs no poten-
tial civil fine or criminal liability.
Under the private law nuisance regime, any landowner’s legal right to be
free of harm caused by another landowner’s development activity is contin-
gent—dependent upon the outcome of the court’s ex post balancing of
harm and utility.  And until the right is determined, the developing land-
owner faces no liability from continuing to pursue her development.  Under
such a legal regime, in bargaining to find a price at which the landowner will
agree to desist from her development, the complaining landowner has to
take account of three crucial facts: first, the court might fail to find that there
is a nuisance, leaving the complaining landowner with no right at all; second,
even if the court does find that the activity constitutes a nuisance, it might
refuse to enjoin it; and, third, this entire highly uncertain process of deter-
mining whether there is a right and a remedy is costly, and it is the com-
plaining landowner who carries the legal burden throughout of establishing
both her right and the remedy.  It is thus likely that the complaining land-
owner bears the bulk of the cost of being awarded a legal right that is effec-
tively remedied.
This allocation of costs under the private nuisance regime generates two
socially valuable, efficiency-enhancing incentives.  First, provided that the
court is relatively accurate at determining the harm caused by and the social
value of the activity that is an alleged nuisance, the fact that the legal right is
uncertain and contingent on the outcome of the court’s balancing inquiry
may actually enhance the efficiency of private bargaining between the land-
owners.  The intuition is that because neither landowner knows for sure
whether she has a right (to continue to operate, or to be free of the harm
from such operations), and because clarifying the right is costly, both parties
have less incentive to delay and posture strategically in bargaining.80
The second efficiency generated by the allocation of the cost of deter-
mining private rights over conflicting land uses is that precisely because nui-
sance litigation is costly, it tends to be what economists call incentive
compatible.  Because a complaining landowner must incur private litigation
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (AM. L. INST. 1979).
79 See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 13 (1985).
80 For a formal demonstration of this point, see Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under
Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995).
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costs to have another landowner’s activity enjoined as a nuisance, the com-
plaining landowner will pursue such litigation only if her benefit from suc-
ceeding—the reduction in harm to her—is greater than her litigation cost.
Forcing a complaining landowner to bear the cost of getting a court to
declare another landowner’s use to constitute a nuisance automatically weeds
out cases where the harm is low and the court is unlikely to find a nuisance.
The environmental permits regime does not create such socially desira-
ble incentives.  Under the permits regime, it is the private landowner, and
not the complaining agency, who must bear the bulk of the cost of persuad-
ing a court that the agency does not have a legal right to prevent the land
use.  This is the opposite of how private nuisance works, where the com-
plaining landowner bears the burden of establishing the nuisance and typi-
cally has the highest litigation costs.
Secondly, in determining whether a federal agency such as the USACE
has a right to prevent land use, courts do not balance the social value of the
landowner’s development against the public value of its cessation.  While
there are a variety of legal issues that may be raised to contest a wetlands or
incidental take permit requirement, the harm suffered by the private land-
owner due to the imposition of development limits that the agency requires
before granting the permit is generally legally irrelevant.  In neither the
Clean Water Act nor the Endangered Species Act did Congress require that
either the USACE or the USFWS consider and weigh the decrease in private
land value caused by the development limits against the value of wetlands or
species preservation at the particular site.  Since Congress did not instruct
these agencies to consider the decrease in private land value, a court would
far exceed its authority in reviewing agency action if it ordered the agency to
undertake such a consideration.  This is the opposite of how private nui-
sance, where either the very existence of a right and/or the willingness of a
court to grant injunctive relief depends upon a judicial finding that the harm
caused by the land use greatly outweighs the social utility of the land develop-
ment activity.
The final and perhaps most economically significant aspect of the sec-
tion 404 wetlands permits and section 10 incidental take permits systems is
that the threat of fines looms as soon as the relevant agency, the USACE or
USFWS respectively, issues a cease and desist order.  As in the Duarte case, a
landowner can challenge the legality of the permit requirement the agency
has enforced via a cease and desist order, but fines begin to accrue as soon as
the agency issues the order.  With private nuisance, as we have seen, the situa-
tion is the opposite: a landowner does not risk fines or imprisonment unless
and until the complaining landowner establishes her right to be free from
harm and persuades the court to grant an injunction.  Only if the landowner
actually violates such an injunction would she incur potential criminal
sanction.
Each of these features of the environmental permits regime is a source
of inefficiency in bargaining over such permits.  Because it is the private land-
owner who has the burden of establishing that the agency does not have a
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statutory right to order the landowner’s activity to be halted, the incentive
simply to avoid litigation costs while ensuring that future development value
can be realized itself provides an incentive for the landowner to pay the
agency for permission to use her land.  As shown with some algebra in the
Appendix, the higher are such litigation costs, and the longer they will be
incurred, the higher is the price that the agency can extract from the land-
owner in exchange for the permit.  As such costs bear no relationship to the
social value or social harm from limiting private land development, if they
are too high, they alone can stop socially desirable private land development.
The second feature—that liability for fines accrues as soon as the agency
issues a cease and desist order—also increases the chance that the permit
deal struck by the agency and the landowner overly restricts development.
With fine liability beginning even before a court has determined that the
agency actually has the legal right to demand a permit, the longer the land-
owner holds out as it litigates in the hope of establishing its legal freedom
from the permitting requirement, the bigger is the landowner’s potential
fine liability.  In a typical bargaining game, say that between a buyer and
seller of a good or service, by holding out and delaying a deal, the buyer
increases the cost to the seller of failing to agree to the buyer’s offered price.
This is due to the time value of money—one can think of the seller as making
interest payments on a loan she took to produce the goods, or simply of the
lost interest the seller would’ve been earning on the proceeds of a completed
sale.  With bargaining in the reverse eminent domain environmental permits
system, the situation is reversed.  The longer a private landowner holds out
litigating and refusing to pay to buy back her development right, the bigger is
her accrued fine liability.  Because that liability is discharged once agreement
is reached and the agency issues the permit, the longer the landowner holds
out, the higher is the price that she is willing to pay.
When daily fines exceed net value from operations—something almost
surely true in the Duarte case and in many other cases involving small and
medium-sized businesses—the price that a landowner will pay for an environ-
mental permit will be determined primarily by the size of the fine liability
and litigation costs being incurred.  The private value creation allowed by a
permit will be relatively unimportant.  From a social welfare point of view,
this is a disastrous state of affairs.  To be sure, when private landowners bar-
gain subject to the regime of contingent entitlements created by private nui-
sance law, whether a complaining landowner obtains an adjacent
landowner’s agreement to change how it operates, as well as the price paid
for such agreement, does depend in part on the litigation cost of clarifying
who owns the entitlement.  But the main determinant of whether the com-
plaining landowner can actually enjoin and force a change in the adjacent
landowner’s operation is how the social cost of such a change compares to its
social benefit.  And the main determinants of the price in any deal between
the landowners to allow operations is the benefit to the complaining land-
owner and the cost to the enjoined landowner.  By contrast, when a private
landowner bargains with a federal environmental agency for a permit for its
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-4\NDL410.txt unknown Seq: 18  5-APR-21 14:58
1576 notre dame law review [vol. 96:4
developed use, the price that the landowner agrees to pay has little to do with
how environmental harm from such use compares to its private benefit.  The
private benefit relevant in such bargaining is the benefit net of the fine liabil-
ity and litigation costs being accrued by the private landowner.  Under the
private nuisance regime, there is no fine liability, and most of the costs are
borne by the complaining landowner.
For these reasons, even if the environmental agency internalizes what in
some sense may be regarded as the true social cost to the environment
caused by the private landowner’s development, any development restriction
that the landowner agrees to in order to get a permit is likely to go too far.
The reason is that if she fails to agree to the environmental agency’s
demands while continuing to operate (as a private landowner subject to pri-
vate nuisance may do without litigation cost or fine liability), the landowner
faces continuing litigation cost plus the accrual of additional criminal fines
and perhaps an increasing risk of imprisonment.  One may think of the
development restriction as buying the private landowner freedom from fines,
potential imprisonment, and litigation costs.  These bear little or no relation-
ship to either the private development value that the landowner loses or the
environmental value conferred on the public gained when the landowner
agrees to the development limits.
II. CONCLUSION: PUBLIC PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF
PRIVATE VALUE: A BAD POLICY, AND ONE NEVER AUTHORIZED BY
CONGRESS
Under the wetlands and species protection federal permitting programs,
no government actor—neither the USACE, the USFWS, nor any federal
court—is legally required to give any consideration whatever to the loss of
private value caused by land development limits included in bargains
between landowners and regulators that are negotiated in the shadow of such
permitting requirements.  Moreover, agencies such as the USACE and
USFWS are free to attach whatever value they wish to the environmental ben-
efits of such land development limits.  One might well grant that that this is
so, but continue to argue that this was a choice made by Congress when it
wrote the Clean Water Act and Endangered Species Act.  It was Congress, on
this argument, that decided that in granting permits for habitat modification,
the USFWS had enormous discretion regarding whether and how to give
weight to the economic cost of such land development limits.  And so too,
Congress said nothing about how the USACE should consider and weigh the
harm to landowners from land development restrictions imposed in wetlands
permits.
This argument forgets that it was not Congress but the agencies them-
selves—the USACE and USFWS—whose regulatory interpretations literally
defined which wetlands count as “waters of the United States” subject to
USACE permitting requirements and which private land development activi-
ties count as a “taking” of a species for which an incidental take permit is
required.  The public property rights held by these agencies were not created
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by Congress but by the agencies themselves.  Only by a narrow majority did
the Court in Sweet Home Chapter uphold the USFWS’s interpretation that sig-
nificant habitat modification can constitute a potentially criminal species
take.  Many (if not most) USACE regions continue to tell landowners that
whether their lands are regulated wetlands depends upon the application of
the Rapanos concurrence’s amorphous “significant nexus” test.  Under this
test, virtually any periodically wet piece of land can be subjected to develop-
ment restrictions imposed by the USACE under its wetlands permitting
authority, provided only that USACE biologists opine that the land parcel is
part of a larger aquatic ecosystem feeding into an actual river or lake.  This
vast expansion of the scope of the federal wetlands permitting program has
never been endorsed by a majority of the Court, let alone by Congress.
One might well respond—as some members of the Court have over the
years—that even without express congressional authorization, the wetlands
and species protection permitting programs are nonetheless consistent with
policy goals expressed in both the Clean Water Act and Endangered Species
Act.  But the fundamental policy justification for requiring ex ante permits,
rather than relying on ex post damage litigation, is that compensation is of
no help when private land development can cause irreversible, noncompen-
sable harm to public environmental resources.  Agency practice has belied
this justification.  In practice, both wetlands and species permitting programs
have devolved into systems in which land development is permitted provided
that landowners pay compensation deemed to be adequate by federal
bureaucrats.  On the ground reality reveals that the federal wetlands and spe-
cies protection programs have little to do with protecting public resources
from noncompensable harm, but everything to do with empowering federal
environmental bureaucrats to take and redistribute private value.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix presents a derivation of some of the claims made in the
text regarding how litigation costs and the accrual of fines under a permit-
ting system change the price a landowner is willing to pay for a permit.  The
analysis seeks to identify the maximum price that a landowner would pay to
obtain a permit under the assumption that without a permit, the landowner
credibly contests whether she is legally required to obtain such a permit.  In
this sense, the landowner’s maximum price is determined in the shadow of
litigation.
I assume that it takes T periods for a final judicial decision on the legal-
ity of the permit—that is, whether the agency can legally demand it of the
landowner.  The other notation to be used is as follows:
p = maximum price landowner is willing to pay;
δ = landowner per period discount rate (rate at which future value dis-
counted to present value);
v = per period net profit from land development activity;
F = per period fine for development activity without a permit;
c = per period cost of contesting the legality of permit (litigation cost);
q = probability that the court upholds the legality of the permit requirement.
In deriving the maximum price, p, I consider (for simplicity) the case
where the fine F and value from development v are such that v < F.  In this
case, the landowner will cease the activity rather than pay the fine.
Consider first a legal world where there is no fine liability unless and
until a court determines that the landowner must obtain a permit.  This is
somewhat like the private nuisance regime.  In this case, having developed,
the landowner incurs the per period cost c to challenge the legality of the
permit up until the period T, at which point that court determines whether
the permit is required.  If no permit is required, the landowner has no fine
liability and realizes the value v going forward.  If a permit is required, the
landowner faces a fine of F per period and so stops its development activity.
The landowner chooses between paying the price p for the permit and con-
testing the permit.  It has a higher net present value from buying the permit
at price p versus contesting its legality provided that:
which simplifies to:
(1)
Consider now the legal world where the per period fine F accrues as
soon as the regulator demands that the landowner buy a permit.  At time
period T, the court finally resolves whether the permit is legally required.
There is no fine liability if the court finds no permit is legally required, but if
the court finds that a permit was legally required, fine liability of F per period
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attached for the entire T periods that have elapsed while legality has been
contested.  In this world, the landowner is better off paying the price p for a




By comparing inequality (1) to inequality (2) we can quickly confirm the
assertions in the text regarding the determinants of the maximum price that
the landowner is willing to pay to obtain a permit and how those determi-
nants change when fines accrue before the legality of the fines is determined.
In both (1) and (2), we see that the more complex and costly is litigation
over the legality of the permit—in the notation used above, the bigger are c
and T, the cost and time to resolve the case—the more the landowner will be
willing to pay to avoid such a conflict and obtain the permit.  Also from both
expressions, we see that the higher is q—the probability that the court finds
the permit to be legally required—the more the landowner will pay for it.
Next, comparing inequality (2) with inequality (1), we see that in inequality
(1), where, as under private nuisance there is no potential fine liability until
the legality of the permit requirement has been determined, the fine F does
not influence the price that the landowner is willing to pay to avoid a legal
conflict.  By contrast, from inequality (2), we see that in the world where
fines begin to accrue even before legal rights have been determined, the
higher is the fine F and the probability q that the court finds the fine was
properly assessed (because the permit was legally required), the more the
landowner will be willing to pay to avoid fines.
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